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Summary 
       Many palatable insects, for example hoverflies, deter predators by mimicking well-
defended insects such as wasps. However, for human observers, these flies often seem to 
be little better  than caricatures  of wasps – their  visual  appearance and behaviour  are 
easily distinguishable. This imperfect mimicry baffles evolutionary biologists, because 
one might expect natural selection to do a more thorough job. Here we discuss two types 
of  cognitive  processes that  might  explain why mimics distinguishable mimics  might 
enjoy  increased  protection  from  predation.  Speed  accuracy  tradeoffs in  predator 
decision making might give imperfect mimics sufficient time to escape, and predators 
under  time  constraint  might  avoid  time-consuming  discriminations  between  well-
defended models and inaccurate edible mimics, and instead adopt a “safety first” policy 
of avoiding insects with similar appearance.  Categorization of prey types by predators 
could mean that wholly dissimilar mimics may be protected, provided they share some 
common property with noxious prey.
       Introduction
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Mimicry provides examples of adaptive evolution so striking that they should convince 
even staunch sceptics of the principles of evolution. Perfectly harmless caterpillars look 
like venomous snakes, while angler fish display lures that resemble small fish. In many 
other  cases,  however,  the  match  between  the  mimic  and  its  model  is  almost 
disappointingly sloppy.  Take many of  the familiar  hoverflies:  their  yellow and black 
stripes  might  resemble  a  stinging wasp to  an  inexperienced  observer  –  but  the  body 
shape,  flight  behaviour  and  colour  pattern  of  many  species  easily  identify  them  as 
defenceless flies (Figure 1). Yet, the strategy works: the flies’ coloration pattern must 
provide protection that they would not enjoy if they were, say, plain brown.
Insert figure 1 about here 
A  simple  explanation  for  predator  responses  to  poor  mimics  could  be  that 
predators innately avoid any stripy pattern. Such innate biases do exist [1], but typically 
they  are  weak,  and  can  easily  be  overwritten  by  learning  [2-4].  Therefore,  current 
explanations  of  imperfect  mimicry  refer  to  predators’  individual  experience with 
unpleasant mimics, and responses to mimics that are guided by such experience. Previous 
explanations of imperfect mimicry include:  a) the possibility that differences in visual 
systems between humans and insectivores (typically avian predators)  might mean that 
what constitutes a poor match for human observers might in fact be perfect mimicry for 
some  predators  [5];  b)  that,  in  the  presence  of  multiple  aposematic  models,  mimics 
attempt to find a compromise by appearing intermediate to all of them [4,6]; and c) that 
generalisation  of  predators  to  distinguishable  but  similar  prey  might  give  sufficient 
protection for poor mimics [3,7,8]. These explanations remain controversial [4], but we 
do not question their validity in some cases. However, the predator learning processes 
that have been discussed in the context of mimicry are essentially Pavlovian, in that they 
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invoke only simple processes of information storage, generalization and forgetting [9] 
and thus do not fully capture the complexity of cognitive abilities that predators might 
use.   Here  we discuss  two cognitive  abilities  that  allow predators  to  make  effective 
decisions  about  whether  or  not  to  attack  while  maintaining  a  low  level  of  risk  of 
confusing a nutritious mimic from its noxious model. These processes may be exploited 
by imperfect mimics. 
     
Speed accuracy tradeoffs in animal decision making? 
       Everyday experience shows that difficult perceptual tasks require more time than 
easy  tasks.  If  time  is  limited  for  difficult  judgments,  you  are  more  likely  to  make 
mistakes. Consider a hypothetical football match where one team wears red and the other 
orange.  The two colours  are  easily  distinguished,  but  as players  continuously change 
position and mingle with one another, the time for classifying them as members of one or 
the other team will be limited. The result is confusion of red and orange that will make 
the match substantially less enjoyable. Conversely, when it is essential to avoid mistakes, 
more time is needed. A mushroom collector has to make triply sure not to mistake a 
death  cap  (Amanita  phalloides)  for  the  similar  and  edible  false  death  cap  (Amanita  
citrina). If, after extensive inspection, there is any uncertainty, a false alarm is preferable 
to  a  fatal  error!  Understanding  such  speed-accuracy  tradeoffs  is  an  essential  part  of 
contemporary decision theory [10].
           In bees and mice, just as in humans, sensory discrimination typically improves 
with the time allowed for a decision, and difficult discrimination tasks require more time 
to be solved with high accuracy  [10-13]. Such speed-accuracy tradeoffs result from the 
need to sample information over time in noisy conditions, so that evidence for competing 
options  accumulates  until  a  decision  threshold  is  reached  [11,14-16].  Such  tradeoffs 
should  be  of  fundamental  importance  to  animal  decision  making in  the  economy of 
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nature,  but  their  relevance  in  the  natural  lives  of  animals  has  only  recently  been 
considered  [12,17-19].  There  are  obvious  implications  for  predators,  when  similar 
mimics  must  be  discriminated  from  noxious  models;  especially  in  time-constrained 
situations, such as scramble competition or when the prey might escape. Data on speed-
accuracy  tradeoffs  for  avian  predators  are  still  outstanding,  but  we  suggest  possible 
avenues of future research below. 
Testing the role of speed accuracy tradeoffs in predators judging inaccurate mimics 
An appropriate test of the interaction between choice time and precision of choice 
needs  to  involve  prey  items  that  are  only  briefly  on  display,  or  moving,  rather  than 
stationary  and  with  no  time  limitations.  Because  there  are  ethical  concerns  with 
experimental designs where birds might be stung by insects, live prey cannot be used; 
instead penalties might consist of food rendered unpalatable with bitter quinine solution 
[12]. Two types of experimental setups seem feasible. Either, prey items can be displayed 
(for a limited time, or moving at a given speed) to birds pecking at a monitor (with food 
or penalties being subsequently given depending on choice accuracy) [12]; or, food items 
may be attached to printed displays of an aposematic insect, or a mimic that can be varied 
in  similarity  [20].  Such items could be moved through a flight  cage being pulled by 
transparent strings at predetermined speed; this scenario is more realistic than computer 
screen setups because the visual stimulus is effectively the actual prey item, as in nature. 
It will be essential to vary the display time or movement speed, as well as the number 
(and perhaps direction of movement) of palatable and unpalatable prey,  to mimic the 
crowded  conditions  that  predators  might  encounter  in  nature.  Both  sequential  and 
simultaneous choice should be tested.
It will first be necessary to quantify the speed-accuracy trade-off depending on 
the similarity between unpalatable models and palatable mimics. Emphasis can be placed 
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either  on  accuracy  (by  varying  the  severity  of  punishment  for  errors)  or  speed  (by 
limiting the time available for an attack). Once such  baseline data are established, two 
predictions are especially worth testing. One is that if discrimination between a model 
and a mimic costs appreciably more time, even relatively inaccurate mimics might gain 
time  to  escape  [21].  Consider  your  own  response  to  a  yellow-and-black  hoverfly 
approaching you on a summer day: the first reaction might be that you are temporarily 
alarmed, even though close (but time-costly) inspection might identify it as harmless. The 
second  prediction  is  that  a  predator,  under  time  constraint,  will  avoid  time-costly 
discriminations  between  defended  models  and  inaccurate  edible  mimics,  and  instead 
adopt a “safety first” policy of avoiding all insects with similar appearance. This could be 
tested by offering  three types of prey that vary in colour and palatability, for example: A 
(red, unpalatable – the aposematic model), B (red-orange – a "mimic" similar to A, but 
palatable), and F (blue, palatable but distinct from A). An optimal forager should choose 
B and F, but there is of course the risk of errors  (“confusing” A with B). Thus, in a 
situation  when time is  limited,  predators  should  go for  safe  option F.  However,  this 
would involve false alarm errors, avoiding the profitable B, and halving the intake rate. 
These  experiments  should  identify  the  range  of  similarity  in  which  speed  accuracy 
tradeoffs mean that inaccurate mimics might not only enjoy improved protection from 
predators relative to palatable insects without aposematic colouration, but also, critically, 
the a further increase in similarity to the model might confer no further fitness benefits. 
Insert Figure 2 about here
Categorization of food types by animals
Categorization allow us to classify stimuli in meaningful way (e.g. as dogs, cats, 
chairs,  tables etc.),  and independently of their  individual shape and colour.  Note that 
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categorization  differs  from  generalization.  Generalization  allows  animals  to  attribute 
common properties to distinguishable objects; however, the level of similarity can vary in 
a continuous fashion, as when one sees a greater similarity of yellow to orange than to 
red, and likewise of yellow to lime than to green. On a continuous sensory dimension, 
such as the visible spectrum,  the extent of generalization from a given stimulus value 
(e.g.  wavelength  of  light)  typically  has  a  Gaussian  or  exponentially  shaped function 
centred on that value [7,22,23]. By comparison, categories have definite boundaries – an 
object is either a member of a category or not – and they can include diverse or entirely 
dissimilar items, such as dogs or fruit, but a category has some defining feature that is 
common to all  its members.  Categorization may also be understood as a strategy for 
being economic with memory – by extracting the cues that define a class of objects, 
rather  than just  a single object,  an animal  might  circumvent  having to  memorise  the 
appearance of dozens of salient objects [24].
 
A predator without categorisation might make almost inconceivably inappropriate 
judgments: consider an animal that, after being stung in the tongue by a black-and-red 
bumblebee,  treats  a  black/yellow/white  striped  bumblebee  as  potentially  palatable. 
Hence,  categorisation  is  adaptive,  but  there  is  a  risk  of  “false  alarm”  errors,  where 
palatable mimics (even if they bear no direct similarity to aposematic prey)  fall within an 
avoided category. Pigeons and chicks have been shown to be able to form categories 
[23,24]; for example, Cerella [25] made a good case that pigeons recognise oak leaves as 
a  natural  category.  In  particular,  after  learning  a  single  oak  leaf  shape,  they  did  not 
discriminate between a wide range of oak leaves, but reliably distinguished oaks from 
leaves  of  other  species.  As  with  tree  leaves,  aposematic  insects  such  as  wasps, 
bumblebees and shield-bugs (Pentatomidae) have a characteristic shape that birds might 
recognise  as  natural  kinds;  alternatively,  they  might  classify  patterns  according  to 
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whether  or  not  they  contain  more  than  one  colour  (independently  of  the  particular 
combinations of colours) etc. 
Testing the role of prey categorization in insectivores
Rather  than  just  associating  one  colour  pattern  with  an  unpleasant  experience,  do 
predators learn the rules for classifying patterns, such as those that are displayed by toxic 
insects,  to  predict  whether  an  unfamiliar  species  of  insect  is  safe  to  eat?  In  human 
education a successful strategy is first to learn the rules, then the exceptions. If birds first 
learn  the basic  principles  of warning coloration,  then even poor  mimics might  enjoy 
protection, especially when predators have to make rapid judgements (see above). For 
example, after  a predator  has had unpleasant encounters  with two distinct bumblebee 
species, it  might categorise by prey shape and not colour,  and subsequently avoid all 
bumblebees irrespective  of colour  banding pattern.  An especially  interesting  question 
concerns the way in which animals establish categories after learning about a number of 
distinct stimuli that share common properties. It is widely thought that groups of similar 
but discriminable prey species form so-called ‘mimicry-rings’ [3,4,26] (Figure 2), and 
there is experimental evidence that birds can establish well-defined color categories from 
multiple examples [22]. In nature, after  being exposed to two or more different wasp 
species that differ in shape and colour but share a high contrast stripe pattern, birds might 
categorise  by  pattern  and  irrespective  of  shape,  therefore  including  some  hoverflies 
despite  their  difference  in  body shape.  These  questions  should  be  straightforward  to 
address  experimentally,  using  sequential  exposure  to  different  prey  items  either  on 
computer screens, or printed patterns with food attached (see above). Understanding how 
avian predators classify the range of patterns that are displayed by hymenopterans and 
their mimics, depending on individual experience, and the cues that they extract to form 
categories will give valuable insights into the evolution of mimicry, and also provide a 
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naturalistic context in which to address wider questions about the cognitive processes that 
underlying  object  recognition  in  non-human  species  [27].  The  differences  between 
responses  following  training  to  single  and  multiple  examples  will  give  important 
information  about  the natural  history  of  mimicry  rings,  and  the  underlying  cognitive 
processes. An important (and untested) prediction is that if predators use experience with 
multiple  prey  types  to  learn  rules  rather  than  just  memorising  the  appearance  of 
individual prey types, it follows that different individual predators should form different 
categories,  each  including  separate  types  of  novel  prey  –  depending  on  individual 
experience. 
       
Conclusion       
       Mimicry - the phenomenon where organisms converge in appearance on one another, 
often to warn or deceive predators – is one of the most venerable and at the same time 
most  dynamic  areas  in  whole  organism  biology.  Recent  developments  in  animal 
cognition now make it possible to understand not only how animals perceive mimicry 
systems [5,28,29], but also how they store information about such systems, how such 
information consolidates and changes with experience and with time [30-32], and how 
animals might extract the general rules by which animal colouration and palatability are 
linked. Incorporating realistic time constraints into experiment designs, and the visual 
information  processing  speed  of  predators,  should  help  identify  the  conditions  under 
which  the  cognitive  processes  of  predators,  which  will  be  adaptive  under  most 
conditions, will sometimes create quirks that produce space for inaccurate mimics to live. 
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Figure 1: Two wasp species and four less-than perfect and palatable mimics. a) 
Dolichovespula media; b) Polistes spec.; c) Eupeodes spec.; d) Syrphus spec; e) 
Helophilus pendulus; f) Clytus arietes (all species European). Note that species c-f) do 
not look closely similar to any wasp species. The three hoverfly species differ in wing 
and body shape, antennal length, flight behaviour and striping pattern from European 
wasps. One fly species (e) even has longitudinal stripes which wasps typically don’t. The 
harmless wasp beetle does not normally display wings, and its legs do not resemble those 
of any wasps. Photos a,c,e and f by Rob Knell; photos b and d by Tom Ings. 
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 a) b) 
    
      c)      d) 
Figure 2. Colour coats of European bumblebees, and a stingless mimic. a) Bombus  
lapidaries; b) B. terrestris; c) B. pascuorum and d) the fly Volucella bombylans. Note 
that b) and d) are considered part of the same mimicry ring [26], even though they are 
clearly distinct – but a predator categorizing by shape might respond equally to both, as 
to the highly distinct B. lapidaries (a), and the individual of the fly V. bombylans (d) that 
looks like no particular Central European bumblebee species, but captures the overall 
essence of a bumblebee-like appearance (body shape, and hair coat, and some form of 
stripes. Photos a) and b) by Tom Ings; photo c) by Mike Edwards and d) by Rob Knell. 
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